Abstract
Introduction
The ever increasing importance of ERP solutions to (cross-)organizational integration and coordination problems implies an increase in the importance of RE for ERP. This is the concept of applying standard offthe-shelf process models, composed by reusable RE practices and artifacts, that purport to provide most of the solutions to the ERP adopter's RE challenges. These models bring RE standards, templates, procedures, and tools -that enforce the standards and the procedures, to ERP adopters to diverse problems when instantiating live processes in specific project settings. ERP software vendors (e.g. SAP and Oracle) endorse the so-called best practices not because they have precisely quantifiable values, but rather because successful ERP projects seem to commonly use them in RE. A good-practice-driven RE model is therefore assumed to ensure that the ERP adopter gets more predictable process results and increased chances of process success. Published ERP adopters' experiences indicate that standard ERP RE processes did help them (i) adapt to changing business environments and (ii) develop a shared system iteratively and incrementally while harmonizing company's decision-making processes at all relevant management levels and locations [15] . However, consistently succeeding in instantiating a standard RE model is rare. Indeed, typical RE concerns, like protracted requirements activities, requirements creep, underestimated change impacts, are known to only aggravate in ERP settings [5] . In our earlier empirical studies [3, 4] , we investigated the challenges organizations face when adopting a standard ERP RE model. Leveraging lessons learnt from our eight years of experience in deploying a standard ERP RE process in a Canadian telecommunications company, we attempt -in this case study, to identify what helps a RE process succeed and what does not. Our objectives are to detect repeating success and failure patterns of RE activity, and to understand how a RE process provides value or fails to do so. We seek to address three research questions: (1) what do more successful and less successful RE process instances look like? (2) how does degree of success or failure vary? (3) is the distinction between RE success and failure immediately evident, and if it is, then to what extent? We report on observations of ERP RE process successes and failures collected in 18 projects which used a standard model to instantiate these RE processes in the context of rolling-out cross-organizational coordination support solutions based on the SAP R/3 package, a leading product in the ERP software market. Our findings are based on data collected by means of RE maturity assessments [3] , informal conversations, interviews, official requirement walkthrough meetings, focus groups, and document reviews. In the rest of the paper, we motivate the case study, present our research method and its application, and report on and discuss the study's main results.
Motivation and related work
As ERP is a major trend for the past 15 years, it is now well documented that the ERP implementation projects often are not delivered on time, or within budget, or with functionality that was specified at the early project stages [15] . Yet, both ERP adopters and vendors are ultimately concerned about lowering failure rates and supporting successful RE. Though, most ERP literature says very little about how to confront this in the requirements stage. ERP publications focus on (i) methodological issues pertinent to the end-to-end ERP implementation cycle, (ii) the definition of critical work packages at project level, (iii) the identification and mitigation of business risks in ERP projects, and (iv) the assessment of ERP implementation processes from business process reengineering standpoint [6, 15] . To the best of our knowledge, very few authors have studied the mechanics of the ERP RE process itself and how it leads to successful outcomes.
Research method
Our research approach draws on results from four emerging fields: (a) value-based software engineering theory and practice [1] that offer quantitative approaches to questions like how much investment in good RE process is enough; (b) previously done theoretical and empirical studies on RE process assessments [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 18] which brought useful insights into the mechanics of successful and less successful RE processes; (c) our own experience in assessing maturity aspects of SAP RE processes [3] and deriving lessons learnt from past practice in ERP RE [4] ; (d) methodologies for building lessons-learnt architectures [9] that guided us in the process of documenting, packaging and analyzing our own RE experiences in our ERP projects. Our research approach is also rooted into the positivist case study research tradition [21] . We have chosen this for three reasons: (i) it is deemed to be best-suited to IS research situations in which an in-depth investigation is needed, but the phenomenon in question can not be studied outside the context where it occurs, (ii) it offers a great deal of flexibility in terms of research perspectives to be adopted and qualitative data collection methods, and (iii) case studies open up opportunities to get the subtle data we need to increase our understanding of complex IS phenomena such as ERP RE. This choice naturally means that our study couples the RE process maturity assessments with the application of qualitative research techniques, as these are oriented towards how professionals view the ERP RE practices, which they are involved in, and 'make sense' out of their experiences.
The case base
Our cases were collected and analyzed in the context of 18 SAP projects completed between November, 1997 and October, 2004 in a wireless telecommunication company. In this period, the author was employed by the case company as a SAP process analyst and was actively involved in the projects. The RE model adopted in the context of our ERP projects was the AcceleratedSAP (ASAP) RE process. It is a project-specific process, engineered and standardized by SAP, and provided to clients by ASAP-certified consulting partners. The ASAP process has been extensively elaborated in [17] . The practical settings for our 18 projects have been described in detail in [4] . They included the following: To manage implementation complexity, each of our projects was broken down in a number of subprojects reflecting the number of components to be configured. For example, the first project had to implement six components and was broken down in six subprojects. The total number of our subprojects in which the standard ASAP process was instantiated was 87. For each subproject, there was a dedicated RE team. This is a group of individuals who are assigned to a specific subproject, contribute time to and run the RE cycle for this subproject, and deliver the business requirements document for a specific SAP component. Each RE team consisted of one or two SAP consultants who provided in-depth knowledge in both the ASAP implementation process and the SAP components, and a number of business representatives, the so-called process owners. They were department managers and subject matter experts who contributed the necessary line know-how, designed new processes and operational procedures to be supported by the SAP modules, and provided the project with the appropriate authority and resources. All process owners had above average level of experience with IT-projects in their departments and, before starting the projects, attended a three-hour training session on the ASAP process. Next, we considered our consultants as an even mix of experts, new hires and novices. Each expert had at least 5 years of configuration and integration experience with a specific SAP functional module. Most experts had ASAP RE experience. Our consulting partners provided evidence that their less experienced staffmembers completed the standard training courses on both the ASAP process and the corresponding SAP modules. However, none of the consultants had any experience in the telecommunication sector; they were unaware of the requirements principles in this domain and were supposed to carry out RE activities under novel and challenging conditions. All the teams were supported by a process architect responsible for architecting the solution, sharing process knowledge and consulting on ongoing basis with the teams on SAP reuse, process methods, and RE tools. The architect was the only resource the teams shared. Our 87 teams worked separately and with relatively little communication among them. This allowed us to initially consider and include 87 process instances in our assessment study. For the purpose of our ASAP process studies [3, 4] , we used the definition of process instance given in [8] : this is the "singular instantiation of a process that is uniquely identifiable and about which information can be gathered in a repeatable manner". We found, though, that 31 out of the 87 instances referred to ERP implementations within one department only. Our interest, thought was in implementations covering at least two departments or business units. So, we got 56 instances which were cross-organizational. We focus on them in this paper.
Scoping the success/failure analysis effort
Both ERP and non-ERP RE literature [13, 14, 15, 16, 19] suggests the following understanding of a successful RE process: a standard RE process model is called successfully instantiated, if four RE process goals are met: (1) business requirements are defined on-time and within budget; (2) expected architecture design is delivered; (3) project resources are used efficiently, (4) RE process stakeholders are happy. In goal 3, the term 'efficiently' means using project resources for doing the things right, provided the project team knows what the right things to do are. In goal 4, the term 'happy' means stakeholders' acceptance and willingness to deploy the process and leverage past RE experiences in future ERP projects.
To get understanding of what happens when making the ASAP model a live process, we systematically assessed the process instances that we observed in each project by means of a standard RE maturity framework, namely the Requirements Engineering Good Practice Guide [18] . The core of this framework includes three maturity levels, Initial, Repeatable and Defined, showing how an organization uses and follows RE practices classified by three types: basic, intermediate and advanced ones. A process assessment based on this framework represents a client-friendly, transparent and easy way for (i) showing conformance with the standard ASAP RE cycle, and (ii) capturing information about ASAP RE practices that worked, those that did not and those that still remained to be practiced. The maturity assessments along with the challenges and the methods used in deploying practices at higher RE process maturity level have been carefully analyzed. Most of our business stakeholders and consultants shared observations about how their RE processes went and how they felt about the resulting products. This was documented in the form of experience packages by using the PROFES method [9] . It let us derive some lessons learnt [4] regarding (i) the practices that have been most neglected during RE, (ii) the practices that have tended to be skipped because of business concerns, (iii) the practices that have been avoided because of consultants' concerns, and (iv) the impact of skipping ASAP activities on the quality of the final business requirement. Furthermore, we analyzed some completeness and consistency aspects of the requirements documents delivered in the process instances [3, 4] . Completeness was tracked by evaluating the rates at which new and unanticipated requirements came in the remaining phases of our 18 projects. Consistency was defined as the percent of the initial requirements that turned out to be in conflict with other subproject's requirements or with high-level requirements. Once both quantitative and qualitative information was collected, we analyzed [9] it to distill and characterize common points of success and failure.
For our study's purpose, we termed 'a RE process success' a situation in which overlapping goals were achieved: timely and cost-effective delivery of requirements, correct architecture design, happy stakeholders. We termed 'a RE failure' a situation in which there was a combination of: missed deadlines, budget overruns, decreased consistency and completeness of the requirements, increased stakeholders' dissatisfaction, and rework in the later project stages due to poor requirements. We devised these definitions because: (i) they reflect the nature of the ERP RE process as a consultative one that implies collaboration on technical aspects and collaboration on how the stages of the consultation will be carried out, (ii) they stress the fact that the RE process delivers to ERP adopters diffuse (or general) value that is difficult to quantify and measure directly; this is the value resulting from the client organization's exposure to good RE practices and sound engineering principles, as well as to predefined working procedures that can be repeated in an efficient and well-understood manner, and (iii) the definitions rest on indicators representing specific, concrete instances of value that can easily be measured with the metrics of reduced cost [6] , optimized time to go live [2] , precise cost estimates, efficient change management [5] , requirements completeness, and requirements consistency [3] .
Based on these definitions, the author devised a process categorization (for the 56 instances) to include some notions about the extent to which a RE process meets its goals. The author came up with 7 alternative categorizations and presented them to a focus group composed by members of in-house SAP team. After comparing the merits and the disadvantages of each one, the focus group voted and identified the categorization that we used in our study; it let our process instances fall in five groups that we refer to as to A, B, C, D and E in the next sections:
• Group A are processes that missed the deadline for the RE cycle, had higher costs than originally planned, or led to rework in the later project stages.
• Group B are processes that delivered requirements with lower consistency and completeness and/or an incorrect architecture design.
• Group C are processes where the RE teams skipped more than 50% of the ASAP standard practices.
• Group D are processes in which process owners remained unhappy with the results.
• Group E are processes that achieved the four goals stated in Section 3 and every RE team member saw it and considered that the advantages the process brought to the project were used to the fullest.
In each group, we analyzed occurrences of specific practices which were used or not. This knowledge then helped us to characterize modes of success and failure in ERP RE (which is in Section 4).
Results
We documented the positive, negative, best and worst experiences from practicing the ASAP process. We focused on examining these 'polar opposites', as recommended in [11] , assuming that some very interesting differences would crystallize. The phrase 'polar opposites' refers to RE processes at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of achieving their goals. We accounted for only those patterns that we found in more than two process instances. Tables 1-4 in this section present the results of our documentation exercise. They show data as a percentage occurrence of a pattern in a group (A,B,C,D, or E) of process instances. For example, in Table 1 , the first pattern, Leverage existing RE practices occurred in 5% of the processes of group A, 22% of the processes of group B, 10% of the processes of group C, 66% of the processes of group D, and 78 % of the processes of group E. The row data in Tables 1-2 allows us to associate positive patterns with the processes of group E that demonstrate achieved process goals, and, thus, qualify to be considered as successful processes. Tables 1-2 show that 5 out of 10 positive patterns and 8 out of 10 best patterns have not been observed in the group A processes. Next, the row data in Tables 3-4 allows us to connect negative patterns with processes of groups A, B, C, and D that missed one or more of the RE process goals. Clearly, we can not expect that negative and worst patterns would not be observed in the successful processes (group E). Table 3 indicates that the negative pattern of Skipping prioritization, occurred in 98% of the group E processes and in 84% of the group A processes. However, our experiences do confirm that the percentage occurrences of the negative and worst patterns in the group E processes is relatively low. Decompose non-functional reqmts as implementable sets of functional reqmts. Next, to characterize how successes/failures vary, we used four descriptive attributes, as recommended by Jones [11] : (i) outcome: this refers to the RE process goals that were achieved/missed; (ii) typical scenarios: these are examples of situations illustrating how goals were achieved/missed; (iii) reasons: these give insight into why a goal was achieved/missed; (iv) process visibility: it addresses if a success/failure is well identifiable for external project observers.
Catastrophic Failure
We defined the catastrophic failure as a situation in which the negative impact to a subproject rises above the costs of internal and external consulting resources utilized for running the ASAP RE process. The failure typically happens through some chain of circumstances that leads to bad decisions based on incorrect information. However, our experience suggests that very few processes (4% out of 56) fail in a way that has an impact exceeding the cost of the RE project stage. We recorded five ways in which a catastrophic failure happened as observed by RE teams: (1) requirements brought unnecessary implementation of complex functionality, (2) requirements overlooked critical architecture design issues as how many separate instances, or versions, of the system to install, (3) requirements brought massive customization of the package, e.g. implementing local reporting formats and semantics, (4) RE teams underestimated change analysis impacts and, later, changes that turned out to be more complex than anticipated, took longer then estimated because more affected system components were found as changes got implemented, (5) requirements turned out to be inimplementable because of implicit built-in assumptions of the package. Furthermore, our observations provided some preliminary evidence into what RE team thought that may have caused catastrophic failures: (a) insufficient validation efforts, (b) failure to realize early enough the problem of conflicting business drivers, which challenged the team's ability to meet the demand for higher quality business requirements and the need for better control in the early phases of the projects, (c) failure to address the risks of having the customization of a standard package out of control versus the costs and the residual risks of each possible reuse handling option, (d) conflicts of people, time and project scope due to insufficient personnel, (e) lack of shared understanding about transmission and interpretation of legally valid business documents handled in the system.
Visible Failure
Visible failure is defined as a situation in which there is at least one process goal that has been missed and at least one dominant and easily identifiable (by RE team members) cause for the failure. Such a process results either in a delay, rework in the stages that follow, poor requirements specifications, or major unresolved disagreements between the process owners and the external consultants. Out of the 56 process instances, 14% have fallen into this category. In this ERP adopter's context, our RE teams indicated, they observed four visible failure scenarios: (1) the RE team rejects reuse options in favor of customization requirements with little or no upfront analysis, (2) the business blueprint includes requirements from unofficial sources, (3) data requirements analysis and modeling activities are skipped, which impedes data conversion in later stages, (4) process modeling activities are skipped, which reduces the awareness of explicit and consistent business rules about the crossorganizational coordination. The RE teans were united regarding the reason they thought was the key for this failure mode: low level of business integration experience and insufficient awareness of both mandatory and optional RE process contents. When assessing RE maturity, the six most cited themes were: lack of shared understanding about levels of crossorganizational business process and data flow coordination; little awareness of the standard ASAP practices critical to the project success; less-than average experience with integrated system implementations; limited competency in making decisions; unawareness of the need to explicitly select the shared quality concerns (e.g. performance, availability) for the design to address; ad-hoc ways of documenting out-of-scope and in-scope customization.
Invisible Failure
This is a slipping process characterized by at least two of the following: (1) RE process adoption without adoption of the cross-organizational RE support tools; (2) ignoring RE process-tool dependencies; (3) limited or no use of RE standards; (4) insufficient or no use of requirements validation techniques, (5) ad-hoc coordination between process owners from different business units/departments. Typically, such a process is bellow average in terms of achieved goals, but the RE team might think it is average or better. To casual observers, the process may appear as successful because it was completed on schedule, the business blueprint looked well, and all of the data and process requirements that were identified in the RE process were in place and, basically, worked in the architecture design. The requirements may have been even effectively negotiated to the process owners and everyone may have read them and signed-off without any improvement suggestions. However, process owners do not return to the process after the initial spirit has worn off, do not show any enthusiasm about the prospect of repeating the process, and suggest other business representatives to take over the remaining stages of the project. Our observations support the hypothesis that the reasons for this lack of interest can be a combination of: the lack of a mechanism to consistently maintain win-win relationships between business units; the predominant view that any activity which doesn't seem to directly contribute to the deadline gets a lower priority; the not-now attitude pushing some RE activities as "to-do-items" for future enhancement projects; the expectation that the consultants should figure out how to fruitfully deploy the ASAP process; the perception for a practice as an unnecessary overhead; the unawareness of the need to change policies when RE staff and tools change; inadequate training; it means that the team wanted to follow the practice but it was impractical in the short term to send staff for training. We assume that some of these observations are symptoms driven by underlying causes, including the lack of clear vision on how to balance people, infrastructure and process components in ERP RE or the lack of an approach to crossorganizational coordination complexity. In our set of process instances, 10.5% went to this category.
Invisible Success
This process mixes both systematic and sporadic application of standard ASAP practices, has no obvious resource or deadline problems, and delivers requirements with average to above average consistency and completeness. The RE team is above average but might think they are good or very good. Casual observers may not notice an invisible failure and invisible success differ. Both process instances might have implemented similar practices and the quality of the resulting deliverables might be equal. The way to distinguish success from failure would be through analysis of metrics like clients' satisfaction [6] , elements of business case analysis [2, 15] , costs of running the RE process and impacts of the requirements on the remaining project stages. Invisible successes accounted for 19% of all process instances.
Visible Success
This is a process that achieved its goals and many project team members know it. Those RE teams who did it (in 39% of all process instances), pointed out that it did not happen due to acceptance to the ASAP process alone. A visible success usually: (1) makes it explicit how the pieces of the cross-organizational business process get divided among stakeholders, (2) puts emphasis on what values and goals are shared, by whom, and how, (3) blends the standard ASAP procedures with the existing RE practice, (4) build up new practices in support of the key ASAP activities of requirements elicitation, modelling and negotiation, so that no delays in the subsequent project stages would happen; (5) establishes common understanding of the RE process with a focus on what counts; (6) sets up and communicates a definition of requirements verification and validation; (7) consistently maintains a focus on the areas where requirements are volatile or where architecture design drivers are unclear. RE teams provided examples which supported the hypothesis that all these capabilities helped (i) achieve a balanced architecture design and more consistent and complete requirements definitions, (ii) get happy clients, and (iii) meet time and budget constraints [4] . External observers can identify a visible success by measuring the extent to which the process changes the way RE team members conduct day-to-day activities or common tasks. Our RE teams compared what they did before and after practicing the ASAP process and how they did it. They indicated that a visible process would transform certain tasks, job roles and procedures. For example, in our cross-organizational projects, enhanced the RE process by storing business process decisions as corporate knowledge assets, linking them to architecture design decisions, and reusing this knowledge in any upgrade or consolidation project that followed. We also set up a tool for extracting business processes automatically from our SAP systems into the corporate knowledge repository. This centralized repository for SAP business processes, documentation and issues, enabled the teams to scope and manage the next project's RE activities cost-effectively.
Resounding Success
A process is 'resounding success' if it brings significant benefits to the organization. The qualitative assessment 'significant' is to mean long-lasting and moving the ERP adopter to 'a new level of RE processawareness, skills, and culture' (as three process owners put it). This is when good practices are learnt and consistently applied where and when needed in ERP RE. Such a process does not merely change tasks, job roles and narrow-scope procedures; it affects the entire large-scale implementation process. 13.5% of our process instances were observed as resounding successes. For example, our observations suggested that, in case of resounding successes, the RE teams consistently relied on shared process and data models, on architecture trade-off analysis, on change impact analysis, and on stable set of ASAP standards. To achieve it, we witnessed that all the elements of the process mechanics must work smoothly.
Discussion
The analysis and the assessment of our 56 instances let's state that RE process instances had their fair share of failures. The implication for practicing RE staff is that a well-defined process will only be a success if they permit it to. In our experience, some ERP RE process failures are harder to identify. We hypothesize that because a large part of process value is intangible, a large part of failure to deliver value is also intangible. To RE practitioners, this means that they should identify appropriate criteria to clarify the difference between success and failure.
We explored the relationship existing between success and failure modes and levels of RE process maturity. The six modes of success/failure were allocated to the REGPG process maturity levels [18] . Our findings support common sense notions: we found the catastrophic and visible failures to tend to be Initial level processes. We also observed that Defined level processes appear to raise the odds of success. We noted however that Repeatable level processes might vary widely in terms of degrees to which RE goals are achieved. This fits the intuitive thought that merely bringing in the generic process model is not enough. These early observations allowed us to conclude preliminarily that the distinction between RE process success and failure is not always immediately evident.
We also explored how the various process instances managed time and efforts. Our overall observation is that despite our 56 teams were exposed to a welldefined RE process model, each of them managed time and effort quite differently. Because of space limitation, we do not present the resource distribution graphically. In summary, what we observed was that the RE teams of catastrophic and visible failure processes were extremely focused on the requirements elicitation end of the RE process. They pointed out that relatively little time was spent on documentation and modeling as well as on negotiation activities. The invisible failures and invisible successes had similar resource distribution patterns. The RE teams in these two groups spent a lot of efforts on documentation and modeling but relatively little on elicitation and validation and negotiation. The visible and resounding successes were experienced as ones with the most effort spent on negotiation activities. Our findings suggest that putting effort into RE later might be more successful than spending most of efforts in the elicitation tasks.
Finally, we identified and evaluated some validity issues that can call into doubt the results of our study or the conclusions from our results. We borrowed the systematic process in [20] that suggest researchers address four types of validity threats: First, the major threat to external validity arises from the fact that the company, or the telecommunication sector in which the company operates, might not be representative for the entire population of ERP adopters. We though believe, that our project context is typical for the telecommunication companies in North America. We judge these settings typical because they seemed common for all SAP adopting organizations who were members of the American SAP Telecommunications User Group (ASUG). The ASUG meets on regular basis to discuss project issues and suggest servicesector-specific functionality features to the vendor for inclusion in future releases. The R/3 components our case company implemented are the other ASUG companies have in place to automate their non-core processes (human resources, accounting, inventory, sales& distribution, cell site maintenance). Second, the key threat to the internal validity is concerned with any "alternative explanations" for the outcome when analyzing RE process instances in terms of achieved goals. That is to say that while carrying out this analysis, process instances were specific and the final assessments were only due to coincidental factors. To make sure we have evidence that what the RE teams did in the study (i.e., the choice and the execution of a RE practice) caused what we observed (i.e., the outcome) to happen, we selected representative RE teams. All process instances yielded the same outcome when specific sets of practices were executed. This increased the validity of the teams' claims. Third, the major threat to construct validity stems from the fact that measuring the quality of requirement documents (e.g. its consistency and completeness) might be confounded by the lack of any distinction whether requirements are changing because of changing business conditions or because of faults and omissions errors in the ERP RE cycle. Fourth, we see as a conclusion validity threat the lack of inferential statistics based on which we can conclude about the degree to which the relationships between outcomes and reasons are reasonable, even despite the fact that
